Law of Power 3: Conceal Your Intentions - Security Printing and Imaging -
Law of Power 3: Conceal Your Intentions

In a continuing interpretation of Robert Greene’s 1998 bestseller, “The 48 Laws of Power” (Penguin Books), I turn it sideways (using the laws to fight counterfeiting and other forms of fraud) and then turn it upside down (using the laws to create better businesses).

Today we address Law #3: Conceal Your Intentions. This is a law in two parts.

(1) Use decoyed objects of desire and red herrings to throw people off the scent. Greene suggests false sincerity, ambiguous signals and misleading objects of desire.

(2) Use smoke screens to conceal your actions. Always leave yourself contingency pathways.

Many of Greene’s anecdotes focus on warfare and negotiation, and specifically on the cunning of different strategists. Strategies, as can be seen, cannot be “universally recommended”—that is, they do depend on the individual. Kissinger’s prowess as a negotiator, for example, was fueled by his ostensible dullness. Greene portrays Kissinger as nearly lulling his adversaries to sleep and then just as the wave of ennui threatened to submerse them in torpor, he would make otherwise unreasonable demands and get buy-off.

Such a strategy, clearly, would not have worked for Napoleon. Instead, Napoleon’s path to success would have been to put more power in the hands of his competent students of the Laws of Power—Talleyrand and Fouché, for example. Napoleon, being Napoleon, was unable to work with such indirect, “cunning” personalities.

A key to concealing your intentions is to eschew the use of a pattern. This is not the same as foregoing a design. Without a design, you are quite liable to respond to any nuance, distraction, red herring, or ploy of your adversary. The design is essential, as it is nothing else but the pathway from the present to the future. Your design, however, should include decoyed objects of desire and smoke screens to prevent anyone else from determining your design. If your pattern is A, B, C, D, guess what? Your adversary can pick E, F, G, H, etc., to face you. And a smart adversary (you must assume your adversary is smart until proven otherwise) will pick the node in the sequence where she is relatively strongest in comparison to you.

What could be more fun? Combining creativity, design, thinking on your feet and secrecy—concealing your intentions gives you time to collect information on your adversary. And, when the reversal occurs, it should not be ambiguous. When you suddenly reveal your intentions, either because of a (well-earned) reputation for fraud or because it will no longer provide value to conceal your plans forward, do it in full.

Think of Hamlet. The play was indeed the thing to catch the conscience of the king, and Hamlet knew it. He concealed his intentions—was he brooding over Ophelia, going through existential angst, in deep anxiety over an inevitable confrontation with Fortinbras? Meticulously, Hamlet pieced together enough clues to formulate the last stage in his intelligence work. It was the play, with his uncle’s murder of his father echoed in the actions of the players, that would bring out the final, unequivocal reaction in Claudius. After that reaction, the rest of Hamlet’s “contingency plan”, always part of his design, would inexorably bring the bloody end to one of the world’s greatest works of literature. After the play, the rest was almost predestined.

Hidden intent. What am I looking at? What matters here?

 

SIDEWAYS:

Of the 48 Laws of Power, perhaps none is more central to security printing, anti-counterfeiting and brand protection than Law #3. Variable data printing (VDP) provides ease of printing decoys and smokescreens, while hiding the overall intention.

Since every printed region can be variable, the would-be counterfeiter can take one of three (at least) approaches. First, he may try to reverse-engineer every element of the print job. This is a time-consuming, mind-numbing approach, but the advantages are that the counterfeit samples will inevitably appear more real, and so get by more customers and more retailers and more inspectors undetected. Counterfeiters with substantial R&D budgets (and there are many) will occasionally attempt this approach. Other counterfeiters will do the minimum possible to get their products into the supply chain, and so the counterfeit products will be generally easy to distinguish. However, these counterfeiters may be more interested in replace-and-sell strategies, which are consistently seen for example with large systems (cars, servers, airplanes, appliances, etc.) where the parts are very expensive and the system behaves similarly with the counterfeit parts in place. Thirdly, other counterfeiters will simply move to the inside. It is much easier to spoof a product if you simply build the product. Insidious insiders, third-shifters (factory overruns), and false fronts (“fake” companies that work with all of your suppliers) are a significant threat.

Conceal your intentions with counterfeiters by using variable VDP—changing your VDP design is not much more difficult than printing using VDP. Your design is to change; your pattern of change is your own.

Security printing principles are in direct alignment with concealing one’s intents. Decoys are printed marks used to get a counterfeiter to respond, even though they may not be (normally, ever) tracked or investigated. Use decoyed objects of desire and red herrings to throw people off the scent. Printed marks can also be used as “bait” to get counterfeiters to respond to them—generally, these are overt marks, so the lack of response by the counterfeiter usually means that they will not be able to counterfeit for long. Your response may be about the data embedded, or it may be the appearance itself. Use smoke screens to conceal your actions. These decoys and bait can serve as “contingency” deterrents which can be tracked or investigated in cases of need (recall, change in auditing requirements, new regulatory concerns, change in branding, etc.).

Intentions stripped bare. Nothing to conceal. No future.

 

UPSIDE DOWN:

Concealing your intentions is obviously to your advantage when dealing with an adversary. Many would therefore conclude that to benefit from the obvious advantages of Law #3, you will treat your business partners as adversaries, concealing your long-term strategy. I argue for a different approach.

Consider your interaction with worthwhile business collaborators and partners the way you might consider your interaction with worthwhile life collaborators and partners at a social gathering. Start with the premise that your story is boring unless the other can share in the story. Get the other person/partner to speak. Be genuinely interested. Every conversation, every partnership, is a learning opportunity. “Conceal” your intentions by engaging in theirs.

“Ah!” you say, “but there is no security through obscurity.” Meaning the would-be collaborator will also know Law #3 and will be applying it on you, as well. And right you are! That’s the beauty of the approach. If each of you applies the “Upside Down” Law #3, then inevitably the conversation will lead to common ground. It takes active engagement, but it does not preclude concealment of your true long-term plans. Both parties benefit from finding a common, profitable area of engagement, without having to say “I’m not ready to share that with you yet.”

Let’s illustrate with a simple example. UBB (Unbelievably Big Business) has long-term plans to take over all fossil fuel surveying, production and distribution. USS (Unbelievably Sustainable Systems) has long-term plans to provide 100% of the world’s energy needs, where possible, with 100% renewable fuels. In drawing into the conversation discussion of sustainability, UBB comes to understand how “grow and sell local” approaches will significantly streamline their own distribution chain. In drawing into the conversation discussion of the need for high-octane, fossil based fuels in many existing transportation networks, USS comes to understand “asset inertia” and also understands better the adoption roadmap for sustainable energy.

A healthy combination of concealment and the visible. Share enough to help your friends, conceal enough to derail your adversaries.

 

--Steve

See Law #2 at: http://www.communities.hp.com/online/blogs/securityprinting/archive/2009/05/31/law-of-power-2-never-put-too-much-trust-in-friends-learn-to-use-your-enemies.aspx


Posted 06-16-2009 7:34 PM by StevenSimske

Comments

Justin Picard wrote re: Law of Power 3: Conceal Your Intentions
on 06-17-2009 6:27 PM

Hi Steve,

just a few thoughts on this issue.

This topic  reminds me of the debate between "overt" and "covert" authenticators. Overt marks presumably make it easy to authenticate but is presumably easier to copy or at least it is a target for the counterfeiter. Covert marks are useful as a "last line of defense" (i.e. forensic verification) and for gray market tracing if a variable tracking code is included (it will likely not be destroyed by gray marketers).  It  seems to be that a careful combination is the preferred approach, and it is best achieved with digital authentication technologies (secure server access/cryptographic keys/image capturing and processing).  

VDP is one way to conceal your intentions but static printing such as offset can also achieve it, as long as digital authentication technologies are used. You may for example change the authentication data at every work order to conceal your intentions. You may even take a surface fingerprint image of each product and record it in a database (intentions concealed) or print a compressed hash of it on the package (intentions not concealed).  Ultimately, for an authentication technology that cannot be copied nor imitated, there is no need to conceal anything. In the current state of knowledge,  surface fingerprints might be an example of such a technology.  

Cheers,

Justin

StevenSimske wrote re: Law of Power 3: Conceal Your Intentions
on 06-17-2009 9:06 PM

Hi, Justin

Thanks for the excellent insights. One thing we always consider when collecting "a surface fingerprint image of each product " is that this requires the resolution of the fingerprinted features to exceed the MTF (resolving capability) of the imaging devices counterfeiters would use to replicate it (i.e. resolution of individual dot placement by a printer or copier). This is the situation now--surface feature details are beyond the capability of printers/copiers to replicate, but it may not always be so.

Cheers,

Steve

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