Security Printing and Imaging : RFID

Partnership for Safe Medicines

StevenSimske — Sat, 25 Apr 2009 03:58:00 GMT

Security printing, RFID and related mechanisms to address counterfeiting and others supply chain fraud depend on the stick (investigation, evidence, prosecution) and the carrot (reward for compliance). The carrot is readily addressed through variable data printing.

The stick must be wielded carefully. This is the goal of the Partnership for Safe Medicines:

http://www.safemedicines.org/

And, they even provide a helpful acronym, "LEADER" for pharmacists (http://www.safemedicines.org/leaders-guide-for-pharmacists.html):

"The World Health Organization estimates that as much as 10 percent of medicines sold worldwide are counterfeit...It is important for all pharmacists to be aware of the dangers of counterfeit drugs, as well as be able to recognize and help prevent counterfeit drugs from reaching patients...Here are six steps for becoming a L.E.A.D.E.R. in the fight to protect patient safety.

Learn about contraband and counterfeit drugs.

Educate customers.

Avoid unsafe medicines and vendors

Decline suspicious offers. (Partnership for Safe Medicine claims of 365 pharmacies on-line, only 2 are legitimate).

Evaluate your medicines.

Report counterfeit drugs and suspicious vendors."

Good advice. This kind of education goes a long way. Successful anti-counterfeiting ecosystems are designed with a good estimate of the compliance rate. Education like that provided by PSM may not increase compliance, but it makes those pre-disposed for compliance more effective. Remember that 2x2 is equal to 4 just as 2+2 is. If the same number of users are compliant, but are on average twice as effective, the brand and the patient both win.

Cheers,

Steve

(Pipo Caban, gracias para la informacion acerca de PSM)

Stocking Stuffers I: Evolution Whitepaper

StevenSimske — Tue, 30 Dec 2008 04:52:00 GMT

[Part one of whitepaper-length recap's from this year's blog]

An Evolving Allegory

As an allegory for security printing, I have borrowed the concept of pre-adaptation from evolutionary biology. In the next few blogs I will borrow much more extensively from the concepts and terms in evolutionary biology. Evolution and security, I will argue, have a lot in common. Both accept the fact that change is inevitable, not always predictable, and if used properly a systemic advantage.

To set the agenda, I had the pleasure to re-read many of my Stephen J. Gould and Richard Fortey books. Two gentlemen who really knew/know how to write science essays. And, their great essays and chapters have the set the agenda for the five evolution-inspired blogs:

1. Pre-adaptation

2. Co-evolution

3. Mimicry (including Batesian mimicry) and convergent evolution

4. Survival of the fittest, modification, teleology, progress and complexity

5. Punctuated equilibrium

Pre-Adaptation

Pre-adaptation, also known as exaptation or “co-option”, is an instance in which a pre-existing anatomical structure eventually finds utility for a different purpose. A classic example is the pre-adaptation of sweat glands for use as lactating glands in mammals. Milk flow derived from earlier perspiration flow. Perspiration had utility, of course, in heat regulation (and possibly in the attraction of mates—deodorant was rare in the Triassic), and over time the survival advantage offered by the nursing of offspring selected for more and more productive sweat-as-mammary glands.

The other classic example is the pre-adaptation of feathers for wings. Feathers were originally selected for based on their utility in thermal regulation. Over time, presumably a cooling one, longer and more full feathers were selected for, and eventually some small feathered animal (such as the archaeopteryx, the fabled half-dino/half-bird) started seeing the structure and utility of its feathers no longer being selected solely for thermoregulation, but rather for the survival advantage of gliding and eventually flight.

We come to printing and security. How is printing pre-adapted to security? Printing is usually selected for, by the brand owner (detergent company, ticket salesperson, marketer, etc.), for its purpose in helping the customer identify the brand, obtain product information, or purchase the item (think about that bar code scanned at the cash register). In other words, printing has a large set of valuable roles already. Some brand owners select products based on the vividness of the printing, image quality, or layout of the printing. Others are simply looking for the printing of a trusted brand. Regardless, the printing already provides value.

Printing can also be used for security. With the use of security variable data printing, or SVDP, every package, label, ticket or other printed item can contain a unique set of embedded information—bits added to the variable region. So, for example, a 2D data matrix bar code may hold dozens of bits of information; a watermarked image may hold another few dozens of bits; and a variable line of text may contain a few dozen more. This type of “printing variability” illustrates how printing is pre-adapted to overt and covert security. So, VDP, originally selected for due to its powerful means of customizing printing, is pre-adapted to multiple roles of security.

Another aspect of printing is loosely pre-adapted to use in security. This exaptation is the parasitics that form when printing occurs. Parasitics are variations caused by the process of depositing ink on a substrate. For inkjet ink on office paper, as an example, the fibers in the paper will differentially wick the ink in the direction of the fibers. This “random” pattern of ink on the paper can be used as a difficult (if not impossible) to reproduce forensic mark.

Thus, printing can be used to provide all three types of security features—overt, covert and forensic. Not sure if it will be as useful in thermal regulation, but many a printed item, if folded properly (see http://paperairplanes.net/), is indeed pre-adapted to flight!

Co-evolution

Co-evolution is the process by which two species simultaneous exert selective pressure on each other, termed “reciprocal evolutionary adaptations”. Flowers and bees are a good example of mutualism, wherein the shared selective pressure results in a tangible advantage for both species (the flowers get improved pollen dispersion, the bees get the raw ingredients for honey).

Co-evolution can be less synergistic—predators and prey co-evolve, too. When natural selection leads to a cheetah adding on a few more kilometers/hour, the antelope, with a different architecture, can’t keep pace, and so if it is to survive, selection may lead it in a different direction. Thus, the ability to stop and/or change direction on a dime.

Co-evolution also includes the interaction between a host and a parasite. Think of a virus which kills its host every time. In order for it to find another host to support its progeny, there is selective pressure for it to let its host survive. Over time, then, it is selected to become less virulent to its host, and a more stable host-parasite relationship ensues. Such a long-term relationship is analogous to that between the oak and the mistletoe, or that between Dilbert and the Pointy-Haired Boss (http://www.shatteredmoonlight.net/phb/). It is important for the host (oak, Dilbert) to survive so that the parasite (mistletoe, Pointy-Haired Boss) doesn’t perish looking for another victim.

The examples above focus on paired co-evolution. However, in some sense, all species are co-evolving, and so co-evolution can be extended to sets of three, four or more species, interacting and significantly affecting each other. When three or more species are considered together, the situation is termed "diffuse co-evolution".

Co-evolutionary terms can be applied to arenas outside of evolutionary biology. For example, the size of car seats (to accommodate the size of people’s hind quarters) has co-evolved with the size of drink cup holders in the same cars.

This means we can apply co-evolutionary concepts to brand protection. Properly architected, a brand protection ecosystem illustrates mutualism, or the synergistic co-evolution described above. Some of the main principles of mutualism are: 1. Mutual benefit to each species involved.2. All species are free to adapt, independently forming secondary (diffuse) interactions as necessary.3. Collaborative (multiple species often providing complementary and/or redundant capabilities).

In brand protection, the complementary use of RFID and security printing can create a co-evolutionary situation. RFID should be used for shipping and tracking big items, and in other situations in which “line of sight” reading is not possible or tractable. Security printing should be used for smaller items, where “line of sight” reading is possible, and where RFID costs preclude their use. RFID and security printing, therefore, can complement each other for supply chain visibility, product tracking, security and authentication. They are mutually beneficial—RFID helping in workflows for which interrogating printed information is too costly, and security printing helping in workflows for which the item cost of RFID is too costly.

RFID and security printing are also free to adapt. For example, if RFID is someday efficiently and inexpensively printed, security printing may subsume the RFID process and the two will more closely combine. On the other hand, if next-generation printing technologies subsume more and more manufacturing processes—power, sensors, displays among them—a strong partnership between printing and manufacturing (as well as RFID) may create a new type of “diffuse co-evolution”. It will be exciting to see what the market selects for as technology moves inevitably forward.

Mimicry (including Batesian mimicry) and convergent evolution

Change isn’t always for the better. You can, for example, be short-changed. You can change from bad to worse. You can change your Outlook (Microsoft or otherwise). Or you can change a diaper (well, this is better, presumably, for the wearer of the diaper). Even in evolution, change is not for the “better”. Change simply is a consequence of genetic variability implicit in meiosis, mutation and mistakes innate to the reproductive processes.

Our interpretation of genetic change, therefore, depends on the perspective from which we view the change. As I discuss convergent evolution and mimicry in this posting, then, please keep in mind that usually one partner in the convergence/mimicry benefits more than the other.

Convergent evolution and mimicry are two of the most powerful concepts in evolution, as they directly relate to the change wrought by evolution. Since security printing and imaging, and the related supply chain and brand protection issues it addresses, must evolve as technology evolves, I consider these concepts as Part Three of the “evolution analogy” series.

Convergent evolution is the term for analogous structures that arise in genetically unrelated species as a consequence of their environment selecting a similar role for both species. This is different from a homologous structure, which arises in genetically related species. Examples of convergent evolution include:

1. Koalas and humans have independently evolved fingerprints

2. Bats and birds have independently evolved flight

3. Bats and toothed whales have independently evolved sonar-like capabilities

4. Opossums and humans have independently evolved opposable thumbs (pandas, too, although their thumbs are actually extensions of their wrist bones)

Examples of homologous structures are even more plentiful, including:

1. Robins and sparrows can both fly

2. Chimpanzees and humans both can walk

3. Giraffes and seals each have 7 vertebrae in their necks

4. Garter snakes and pythons each can slither

In security printing and imaging, these terms can refer to printed deterrents (homologous structures) and printed vs. non-printed deterrents (analogous structures, or convergent evolution). Security printing is the use of digital variable data printing (VDP) to add information to printed material. Bar codes contain bits of data suitable for disambiguating one item for sale from another item for sale. 1D and 2D bar codes contain different densities of data (number of bits per given area), but may contain the same (point-of-sale, track and trace, etc.) data. Thus, they are homologous (related and having similar utility).

Homology extends to any printed information that can be read and translated; that is, decoded from an image. So, printed features such as color tiles, guilloches, copy-detection patterns, watermarks, and their kin, are homologous—each is a species of the genus “security deterrent”.

Convergent evolution of security printing and RFID, however, is perhaps of more interest. Will all RFID tags be printed with electromagnetic ink (metallic or organically based, for example) someday, and RFID printing simply be incorporated as part of the printing-as-manufacturing process? Or will RFID manufacture move toward nominal cost along another route, and so reduce the importance of printed features in security? If the latter, then the current convergence of utility of RFID and security printing may become an irrelevant distinction—that is, RFID will effectively become “extinct” and become simply a part of printing, or conversely security printing will effectively become “extinct” as RFID assumes the roles of unique identifier, copy-prevention and tamper-evidence.

It seems more likely, though, that we will continue to reasonably view RFID and security printing as two separate species. Two species that are, in some respects, are undergoing convergent evolution. RFID is being extended to include tamper-evident information, using features such as what I term “RFID apoptosis” (programmed suicide possible with “KILL” and related RFID features) and signed additional bit strings. RFID is also, increasingly, being used for additional informational purposes, such as RFID-enable hardware in everything from car tires to refrigerators. Security printing, meanwhile, banking on the innate and broad adaptability afforded by digital VDP (variable data printing), has long been able to provide functionality like that of RFID. Bar codes provide EPCglobal or other mass serialized unique identifiers. VDP lends itself to an inference model based on either pre-printed serialization or inline serialization with real-time inspection. All security printing is missing is non-line of sight reading, although the development of conductive and other metallic inks indicates this hurdle will also soon be overcome.

Interestingly, RFID and security printing continue to “radiate” in terms of their phenotypic utilities, even while converging with respect to each other. This is easier to understand when one considers that they are converging to the same logical set of utilities: track and trace, authentication, point-of-sale, inventory management and forensics.

We come to Batesian mimicry, which is different from convergent evolution. Batesian mimicry can be simply described by example: The “classic” Batesian evolution is when uncommon, tasty animals resemble abundant, foul-smelling/noxious animals. Think of the yummy little bug that looks so much like a nasty tasting bug. Monarch butterflies and wasps have plenty of Batesian mimics out there.

Batesian mimicry also has an analogy for security printing and imaging. Security VDP affords the brand owner the ability to print a surfeit of security features, some overt and some covert. Some of these are tracked (inspected, authenticated, used for track and trace), and some are not. Those that are not, as I’ve noted in past blogs, can be used as “decoys” to get counterfeiters to try to mimic. They can also be used solely for forensic analysis of the counterfeiters, in which case they are not just decoys, but also bait. So, these excess deterrents are Batesian mimics of the tracked deterrents, and your would-be counterfeiter, in an effort to capture all the legitimate deterrents, will also swallow a number of Batesian mimics. The key is that at least one of the security VDP deterrents does in fact leave a bad taste in the counterfeiter’s mouth!

Survival of the fittest, modification, teleology, progress and complexity

Survival of the fittest

One of evolution’s tautologies is survival of the fittest. Whatever is best fit to survive, survives. Whatever survives is, by extension, fittest to survive. A lot like que será, será—whatever will be, will be. Sure, we get it—it’s a definition! However, this is a tautology only when taken from an a posteriori perspective (like the intellectually bankrupt concept of “social Darwinism”). From a different perspective—the a priori perspective—survival of the fittest is a contingency based on the future fitness of a species in a changing environment. And, while you’re living in the here and now, you don’t have 100% clarity of the future. What makes you most fit for survival is not fully known.

You may need contingency traits, which are extra traits that will allow you to respond better to the changing environment. Species that will survive and thrive when the world changes are species that have, serendipitously, differentiating attributes. This means that different future environments will have different future survivors and different definitions of fitness. Fitness is, indeed, arbitrary. Ask any marathoner meaning to bench press 300 pounds, or any bench-pressing behemoth pondering a long run—“fitness” depends on the context.

Since change is inevitable, and since you cannot predict with 100% accuracy what the future environment will look like, it may make sense to have multiple contingency traits to maximize survivability. This is a little tricky for a biological species, but much easier for a security printing job. Contingency deterrents can be added readily by a security variable data printing (SVDP) engine—these are deterrents not currently tracked, traced or authenticated. Contingency deterrents can be used to decoy or bait counterfeiters; in cases of recall; or as “back ups” for currently used deterrents. One contingency is that a counterfeiter “breaks” (reverse engineers) a currently used deterrent. The contingency deterrent allows you to roll over to the already-in-place, previously-unused deterrent—to move from counterfeiting to “counterfitness”.

Modification

Modifications are the driving force behind evolutionary changes. Mutations are the genetic basis for these modifications. Mutations are considered “random” in evolutionary terms—there are no Lamarckian mechanisms for translating life experience into gene alteration. These stochastic changes in genotype lead to (relatively) unpredictable changes in phenotype, and so provide the basis for different levels of “fitness” in a changing environment.

In security printing, modifications are built in to the surfeit of variable data features—so-called “contingency” deterrents described above. These allow a security printing protected product to modify in its strategy—how it deploys deterrents for QA, inspection, tracking, authentication, forensics, decoying and baiting.

Teleology

Teleology is “the study of design or purpose in natural phenomena”. In security printing and imaging, evolution and intelligent design are not internecine concepts. An intelligent design for your security printing anticipates contingencies—the need to stop using a deterrent once counterfeiters have successfully “broken” it, for example. This is termed the innate moving target offered by security printing. In security printing, an intelligent design is indeed one that will evolve as the environment in which it works—an environment that includes reputable and disreputable people alike—evolves.

Progress

Chris Hedges argues in his recent book that one mistake made by extremists of any political, philosophical or ethical flavor is that of assuming we are on the road to progress. However, history teaches us that the process of progress and regression is cyclical. The price of freedom—and progress—is constant vigilance. And once vigilance relaxes, regression seizes the opportunity.

An evolutionary approach to security printing makes no such assumption. An “innate moving target” assumes and endless competition with the counterfeiters. Some times you stay ahead of them for while in this arms race—like the ancient Hittites with their chariot—and sometimes they figure it out quickly. Especially quickly if they bribe one of your own people!

Complexity

The most complex species are generally those most specified for their environment. Horse, humans and hippos are good examples. Will these species evolve into something else? Perhaps. But history warns that bacteria will be around long after hippos, humans and horses are simple part of history. Stephen J. Gould contrasted the frequency of occurrence vs. complexity long-tail phenomenon in one of his works (Three Rivers Press, 1996, Stephen J. Gould, “Full House”, pp. 170-171, the “power of the modal bacter”). Some highly complex species will always evolve, but the majority—and those that survive—will be the simplest.

In security printing and imaging, for example, it is easy to add complexity to your deterrents. A simple example is the use of serif vs. sans-serif fonts. Another simple example is the adding of steganographic information to all of your images. But simpler is usually better. Use multiple security printing deterrents together, and simply change the way the data in one relates to the data in the others. Your deterrents will “live longer” and all of your changes will be made in software, and not in the selection of deterrents themselves.

You’ll live longer, too. Species under less stress survive longer. I suggest security VDP as a survival tool for the fittest of printing professionals!

Punctuated equilibrium

The final section of the security printing/evolution allegory is punctuated equilibrium. Punctuated equilibrium is an evolutionary biology hypothesis largely attributable to Niles Eldridge and Stephen Jay Gould in 1972. The theory states that species normally undergo relatively modest phenotypic change. However, when phenotypic (outward appearance) evolution occurs, it involves rare and relatively rapid change in the genetics of the species. Thus, the genetic similarity for the population is “punctuated”—changing rapidly for a relatively brief period, then changing slowly over a much longer time period.

Punctuated equilibrium does not oppose gradualism, the relatively secure theory of evolution that proposes an incremental change during evolution, with no great discontinuities between generations. Gould noted that punctuated equilibrium is supported by the fossil record, in which species are stable, phenotypically, for long periods of time; then, their descendent species appears in a relatively small time period.

If punctuated equilibrium exists, then what drives this seeming accelerated change? Why does the evolutionary rate seemingly increase? My perspective is that the rate does not necessarily change at all. Instead, the effective rate changes only because the environment itself is changing. So, the normal rate of mutation results in changes that lead to enhanced survival rate precisely because the environment can change faster than the based rate of change. As an example, a comet hits, and all the old advantages for survival—say, size, strength and speed—are less relevant. What survives now may survive because it was actually less fit in the old environment. Thus, the apparent rate of change increases only because the fringe members of the species that do survive become the norm of the “new” species that survive later.

Punctuated equilibrium has been applied to other fields. For example, in 1993, Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones noted that policy change can be described by punctuated equilibrium, inasmuch as policy changes slowly while one regime, party or system is in power, and then tends to change greatly when there is a transition in leadership.

We can apply this to printing, as well. Evolution was slow until the Johannes Gutenberg punctuation of 1440 helped change the slow and laborious process of scribes to the relative speed and efficacy of typed printing. Digital printing, certainly for security and customizability, is providing another “punctuated equilibrium” currently. However, the environment in which printing exists is changing quickly, too. The Internet and other fully-electronic workflows (RFID, for example) mean that many aspects of “traditional printing”—that is, printing 20 years ago—are no longer relevant. Printing that survives will seemingly change faster than the actual printing technology is changing, precisely because the “leaps” will likely survive better than the incremental changes. For example, look at the “–ology” series (http://www.ologyworld.com/), in which printing is merged with “manufacturing”—the inclusion of feathers, flaps and felt, for example—to successfully differentiate the “in-hand” from the “on-line”.

In security printing and imaging, punctuated equilibrium can be used to advantage. With a plurality of printed security deterrents, the brand owner can readily switch between the current deployment of deterrents—which are used for tracking, authentication, forensics, decoying and baiting, any combination thereof; or simply unused for the moment—to a new set and change the security strategy. The outward change in the set of deterrents is minimal or none. Then, when no new deployment strategy is possible—due to compromise of the deterrents or “inside job”—a new set of deterrents is deployed. The new set can be used in multiple future deployments. Thus, the outward rate of change in the security deterrents used exhibits punctuated equilibrium—steady state for a relatively long period, followed by a “massive change”—even though the rate of change for deployment (tracking, authentication, etc.) remains the same.

No matter how you look at it, security is the art of evolving, adapting and changing to survive the environment. Variable data printing makes evolution easier. Change is built-in.

Happy 2009!

-Steve

An Evolving Analogy, Part V: Punctuated Equilibrium

StevenSimske — Sat, 29 Nov 2008 06:44:00 GMT

No matter how you look at it, security is the art of evolving, adapting and changing to survive the environment. Variable data printing makes evolution easier. Change is built-in.

-Steve

[Thanks to Bisbee Finks for helpful comment on the "cladogram", incorporated into the post above--I'm going to pass on the suggested Stalin analogy, though it was definitely creative! Cheers, Steve]

A barcode for everything

StevenSimske — Sat, 25 Oct 2008 03:13:00 GMT

Thanks to my friend, John Keogh of GS/1 Canada, for this link to the "Barcode of Life Data Systems":

http://www.barcodinglife.org/views/login.php

The Barcode of Life Data Systems (using the acronym BOLD instead of BLDS...) product, like John also a resident of Ontario, is an "online workbench that aids collection, management, analysis and use of DNA barcodes".

This is an interesting connection between the real and electronic worlds--species-specific [this adjective brought to you by the Department of Redundancy Department] sequences of DNA simultaneously enabling ease of sequencing and the elimination of false positives (that is, eliminating confusion with another species). Solving the bioinformatics involved in this are worthy of a Fields Medal.

Interestingly from a security perspective is how this translates into the trade off between specificity and ease of reading in any printed (or non-printed, for that matter) deterrent. Error code correction (ECC) is used with barcodes to prevent barcode "collision". RFID uses sequential "sleeping" of the current most active chip to prevent collisions. In each, they still occur. It will be interesting to see what the BOLD team discovers about this trade-off between ease of reading and "collision prevention".

More importantly to security, perhaps, are the implications of the BOLD research with regard to the "Internet of Things". As every item possible--each spoonful of food, each pharmaceutical tablet, each sheet of paper, etc.--can be "tagged" for the plant, animal and fungi species it contains, product tracing will do the equivalent of the IPv4 to IPv6 transformation. In other words, a surfeit of object "IP addresses" will suddenly be available.

Worried, privacy fans? Don't be. Remember, even if the amount of data is doubling every five months (according to some sources, anyway--the Blogosphere is also estimated to double in size every 5-6 months), the amount of "information" is not. A lot more data is created, but our understanding of it isn't. If your spoonful of oatmeal shows a few more DNA from wheat type A than wheat type B, and mine the converse, are they really from different bushels? Probably not--it all comes down to margin of error (not to mention cost of analysis). But, it may make it more difficult to claim higher quality wheat in a product.

-Steve

An Evolving Analogy: Part 3, Convergent Evolution and Mimicry

StevenSimske — Fri, 17 Oct 2008 05:10:00 GMT

1. Koalas and humans have independently evolved fingerprints

2. Bats and birds have independently evolved flight

3. Bats and toothed whales have independently evolved sonar-like capabilities

4. Opossums and humans have independently evolved opposable thumbs (pandas, too, although their thumbs are actually extensions of their wrist bones)

Examples of homologous structures are even more plentiful, including:

1. Robins and sparrows can both fly

2. Chimpanzees and humans both can walk

3. Giraffes and seals each have 7 vertebrae in their necks

4. Garter snakes and pythons each can slither

Convergent evolution of security printing and RFID, however, is perhaps of more interest. Will all RFID tags be printed with electromagnetic ink (metallic or organically based, for example) someday, and RFID printing simply be incorporated as part of the printing-as-manufacturing process? Or will RFID manufacture move toward nominal cost along another route, and so reduce the importance of printed features in security? If the former, then the current convergence of utility of RFID and security printing may become an irrelevant distinction—that is, RFID will effectively become “extinct” and become simply a part of printing. Or, conversely, security printing will effectively become “extinct” as RFID assumes the roles of unique identifier, copy-prevention and tamper-evidence.

-Steve

An Evolving Analogy, Part 2: Co-Evolution

StevenSimske — Sun, 05 Oct 2008 04:59:00 GMT

1. Mutual benefit to each species involved.

2. All species are free to adapt, independently forming secondary (diffuse) interactions as necessary.

3. Collaborative (multiple species often providing complementary and/or redundant capabilities--this may even be applied to humans and dogs).

-Steve

China/New Zealand Contaminated Milk--It's not just about brand protection and anti-counterfeiting

StevenSimske — Wed, 17 Sep 2008 03:18:00 GMT

This blog focuses on security printing to prevent product counterfeiting and provide brand protection. However, the principles covered, if applied in the appropriate manner and context, can protect from product tampering, from product diversion, from product smuggling and from returns fraud. They can also enable efficient, accurate recall in case of product compromise. And, as a consequence, these technologies can SAVE LIVES even while saving money, costs, and environmental impact.

Let's look at the recent China milk scare. It affects New Zealand...

See http://www.nzherald.co.nz/dairy-industry/news/headlines.cfm?c_id=168 for related articles on the New Zealand end. New Zealand exports milk to China to powderize and sell in China and/or export--such is the way of supply chains in 2008. And the reality of this situation is that unexpected problems with product tracking and recall have arisen [See comment below--this statement has been corrected per Helen's comment].

Of course, for the provider, the Sanlu Group, these are BIG problems: http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSPEK27908420080917:

"China fired four city officials and a company boss amid a widening scandal over adulterated milk powder blamed for the death of least two [three now confirmed] infants." Worse yet, the implication is that the milk was tampered with intentionally to hide the fact it was being "stretched": "Melamine, used to make plastic and other industrial products, is rich in nitrogen, an element often used to measure protein levels, and so can be used to disguise diluted milk."

How could security printing and imaging (alone or in combination with RFID, as appropriate) have prevented this tragedy? Repeat the mantra, "security is not about prevention, it's about detection and reaction". With uniquely identifiable, tamper & copy evident packaging/labeling, the offending products could be traced to the exact time and location for the assembly of these products. Sometimes inexpensively, sometimes more expensively, depending on the nature of the product and the nature of the risk to life and limb should the product be tempered with. It's more important, perhaps, to protect Tylenol than Ty-D-Bol, and to validate valium than to authenticate Old Spice. But no product should be able to slip under the radar--especially if you have to print something to convey product information anyway.

So, while several officials have now been sacked, tying the murderous manufacturing to the culpable culprits is important to help deter such a situation in the future. Security variable data printing provides auditing while helping in tracing backwards from the scene of the crime to the planning of the crime. It's about detection and reaction. It's about having every item self-report--in other words, a full provenance record on every product. It's about, possibly, saving a life.

-Steve

Ecosystem Score: Proving It’s Real vs. Proving It’s Fake?

StevenSimske — Sun, 17 Aug 2008 06:43:00 GMT

In the previous blog, I talked about your Deterrent Score, and mentioned you must multiply it by your Ecosystem Score to get your overall effectiveness. As I mentioned in the May 12 blog, it takes PRACTICE to put such an ecosystem together. In today’s blog, let’s talk about how a deterrent might fit into the ecosystem.

Also, for today’s blog, I had a discussion with two of HP’s top experts on anti-counterfeiting. Jim Colby is HP’s Manager for Packaging and Anti-Counterfeiting Technology, and Dave Kellar is a Technical Expert for Package and Product Anti-Counterfeiting. Dave initiated the conversation, sending a link to XStream Systems, Inc.’s XT250 System that provides Authentication Technology with “See –Through” Vision (see http://www.bpcouncil.com/index.php?sid=10&lang=en&act=page&id=716).

The description states that “drugs can be verified while still in their manufacturer's sealed containers – as the system can scan through opaque plastic, cardboard, and even metal packaging to ensure consumer safety”. This is classified as a “forensic” deterrent—meaning a deterrent that can authentic down to the individual item. However, there has to be an ecosystem around this deterrent—starting off with measuring the material property, comparing the property to the correct data for the product, and receiving the real/fake result.

In addition, there are some issues specific to the type of forensic deterrence offered. For one thing, how sensitive is the technology to the active ingredient? Can different concentrations of reagent be readily differentiated? How often are there false positives? How often are there false negatives? Can the “authentic” amount of active ingredient be spoofed with 1%, 10%, 1000% of the normal amount? By including some of it on the packaging?

The ecosystem issues extend well beyond these questions. Who are the intended authenticators? Inspectors? Retailers? Customers? How will these authenticators be educated to understand what to do when the results indicate a failure? And what of cost? How much does the test cost? How much does the education and training cost? How is the data conveyed from the point of testing to the analysis service? How is data integrity maintained? The comment that “Wholesalers acquire conclusive proof of due diligence and of the authenticity of their inventory” could provide a few liability issues if/when there is a mistake (false positive, or especially false negative). In other words, XStream claims to “prove” authenticity, which in my experience is usually more difficult than proving something is non-authentic (or counterfeit).

Take mass serialization data, for instance. A legitimate number suggests but does not prove authenticity, but a non-legitimate number proves something is wrong. Just because the correct active ingredient is present does not prove the product is legitimate. After all, savvy counterfeiters really do want to get away with it as long as possible without having to change to another product.

I ran these concerns past Jim and Dave. Dave’s feedback was: “The main area of interest for me was the process to check the product through the package, eliminating the risk of used packaging or refills. The main problem is still who would check, as I do not see this system as a consumer overt confirmation. As you stated I do not believe the system could check for fake product salted in with the good or the ingredient added to the package material.” Like me, Dave was excited that the device allows you to potentially check the product through the packaging. This is even more powerful than RFID, which allows you to check the mass serialization information through the outer packaging.

Jim backed this up. He noted “I too am enamored with the concept of 'authenticating' actual product through packaging, and this does take the serialization step farther, but with all the same issues with serialization; namely, how to interpret results.” Jim noted that wholesalers would have difficulty arguing for “having conclusive proof of authentic inventory”. Jim also offered the important observation that “the more complex and costly it is to 'authenticate' a product-- the happier a counterfeiter becomes, because they know very few people will have the means to check and so very few products will actually get checked". Indeed, trying to outspend a counterfeiter is never a good idea.

Based on this example of a very good technology being deployed into a rather challenging ecosystem, we see that the Ecosystem Score is really dependent on much more than technology. It depends on simplicity; that is, ease of training and implementation as much as ease of performing the authentication. It depends on an “impedance match” between what you are trying to prove and what you actually can easily prove. In my opinion, this technology will be very useful in screening large lots by (indepthly) analyzing only a sample of the product. It may be less useful at the item level.

-Steve