Security Printing and Imaging : authentication, anti-counterfeiting

Are You Making It Too Easy for Counterfeiters? Then, Let Me SLAP You!

StevenSimske — Wed, 27 Aug 2008 15:22:00 GMT

Acronyms and anagrams are excellent means to simplify a message and to provide easy recall of this message (thus, the word “mnemonic” [Greek origin]—assisting or intended to assist the memory). For example, in 3^rd Grade, I figured out that my last name was an anagram for “KISS ME”. And I conveyed this knowledge to all of my female classmates. Which, not coincidentally, leads us to discussing the mnemonic SLAP.

SLAP, in the case of producing an effective ecosystem for brand protection and anti-counterfeiting, is an acronym for Scalable, Logical, Analytical, and Progressive.

Scalable means that the solution you propose can be used on multiple production runs, multiple products (SKUs), and for a reasonable amount of time. Don’t try to “divide and conquer”—that is, don’t use a completely different approach on different products. It will confuse your customers, your retailers, and your inspectors. Not only will it make it more difficult for you to get good authentication feedback, but you actually may increase the perception that your products are being counterfeited. Product “A” has deterrents 1, 2 and 3 on it, but Product “B” has deterrents 4, 5 and 6 on it—hmmm, one of these is probably fake. Or, worse yet, the would-be authenticator simply tunes out—too complicated, not worth it, too hard to figure out how to authenticate the product. Keep the message simple, and use an innate moving target for deterrence rather than actually changing the target. Security Variable Data Printing (SVDP) is such an innate moving target. One can change the information embedded in the security print, but never change the way a user interacts with it. And, because SVDP affords so many different means of embedding trackable and authenticable data, it is innately scalable, as well.

Logical means, well, think! Don’t make it easy on the counterfeiters. Here are some illogical approaches: (1) Spend a lot on your deterrent (counterfeiters love these “high margin” deterrents, because they’ll always knock them off more cheaply, and it decreases your margins while increasing theirs); (2) Use a deterrent/approach for only a short while and then stop using it (now your would-be authenticators don’t know what to expect—was it the old deterrent or the new deterrent, and which is legitimate). Much more logical: any time you roll out a new deterrent, which is unavoidable for some products—educate your authenticators; (3) Confuse different utilities in a familiar approach. Using variable data inside a hologram is one such example—most users think holograms are “variable” already, and aren’t likely to even notice the fact that one hologram is different from another; (4) Confuse machine vs. human readability. If you use a deterrent intended for machine reading, then embed data in a way that machines can read better than humans. And vice versa. Humans, for example, are very good at noticing alignment differences and relative color differences. Mach bands and other optical illusions are entirely invisible to machines. Machines are much better at noticing absolute color differences and of course steganographics such as watermarks. Meaning metamerisms are mainly meant for machines (alliterative, no?).

Analytical means your approach to the ecosystem should be geared at generating quantitative data. What is the compliance rate (i.e. what percentage of would-be authenticators actually try to authenticate)? What is the counterfeit rate? Read failure rate? If you can’t disambiguate these latter two—counterfeit vs. read rate, that is—you do not have an analytical solution. SVDP again underpins such an analysis: a counterfeit sample will generally have a different combination of print quality, print forensics and payload (data to be read) than a legitimate but unreadable—e.g. damaged, read with poor lighting, etc.—sample. Because of the multiple modalities—color, saturation, intensity, steganographics, halftoning, etc.—involved in printing, SVDP provides many on-ramps for analytics.

Progressive, finally, means that your approach allows progressively more complicated analysis to proceed smoothly. From an imaging standpoint, this means we move from image quality assessment (image “grading”) to image inspection to image authentication to, finally, image forensics. At each stage, a more in-depth analysis—and thus more difficult to reproduce—of the printed material is obtained. Making the first stage, image grading, relatively fast and painless, is an excellent way to generate “leads” from your customers. HP and many other brands address this by using “high-end” overt deterrents on their packaging. Customers are familiar with the motif—color-shift, thermochromic, etc.—and so notice when these have been unsuccessfully knocked off. Inspection ties layout and partial authentication to quality. Authentication ties the print job to the database of legitimate products. Forensics ties the data to the very material printed on, as discussed in my previous blog.

We can now add “SLAP” to the list of SVDP-related mnemonics, which also includes ACID (May 19)—All Content Is Dynamic—and PRACTICE (May 12)—Plan, Research, Activate, Collect, Train, Investigate, Convict, Evolve. Hopefully, this helps you recall a logical approach to brand protection. If not, well then, TTFN!

-Steve

Ecosystem Score: Proving It’s Real vs. Proving It’s Fake?

StevenSimske — Sun, 17 Aug 2008 06:43:00 GMT

In the previous blog, I talked about your Deterrent Score, and mentioned you must multiply it by your Ecosystem Score to get your overall effectiveness. As I mentioned in the May 12 blog, it takes PRACTICE to put such an ecosystem together. In today’s blog, let’s talk about how a deterrent might fit into the ecosystem.

Also, for today’s blog, I had a discussion with two of HP’s top experts on anti-counterfeiting. Jim Colby is HP’s Manager for Packaging and Anti-Counterfeiting Technology, and Dave Kellar is a Technical Expert for Package and Product Anti-Counterfeiting. Dave initiated the conversation, sending a link to XStream Systems, Inc.’s XT250 System that provides Authentication Technology with “See –Through” Vision (see http://www.bpcouncil.com/index.php?sid=10&lang=en&act=page&id=716).

The description states that “drugs can be verified while still in their manufacturer's sealed containers – as the system can scan through opaque plastic, cardboard, and even metal packaging to ensure consumer safety”. This is classified as a “forensic” deterrent—meaning a deterrent that can authentic down to the individual item. However, there has to be an ecosystem around this deterrent—starting off with measuring the material property, comparing the property to the correct data for the product, and receiving the real/fake result.

In addition, there are some issues specific to the type of forensic deterrence offered. For one thing, how sensitive is the technology to the active ingredient? Can different concentrations of reagent be readily differentiated? How often are there false positives? How often are there false negatives? Can the “authentic” amount of active ingredient be spoofed with 1%, 10%, 1000% of the normal amount? By including some of it on the packaging?

The ecosystem issues extend well beyond these questions. Who are the intended authenticators? Inspectors? Retailers? Customers? How will these authenticators be educated to understand what to do when the results indicate a failure? And what of cost? How much does the test cost? How much does the education and training cost? How is the data conveyed from the point of testing to the analysis service? How is data integrity maintained? The comment that “Wholesalers acquire conclusive proof of due diligence and of the authenticity of their inventory” could provide a few liability issues if/when there is a mistake (false positive, or especially false negative). In other words, XStream claims to “prove” authenticity, which in my experience is usually more difficult than proving something is non-authentic (or counterfeit).

Take mass serialization data, for instance. A legitimate number suggests but does not prove authenticity, but a non-legitimate number proves something is wrong. Just because the correct active ingredient is present does not prove the product is legitimate. After all, savvy counterfeiters really do want to get away with it as long as possible without having to change to another product.

I ran these concerns past Jim and Dave. Dave’s feedback was: “The main area of interest for me was the process to check the product through the package, eliminating the risk of used packaging or refills. The main problem is still who would check, as I do not see this system as a consumer overt confirmation. As you stated I do not believe the system could check for fake product salted in with the good or the ingredient added to the package material.” Like me, Dave was excited that the device allows you to potentially check the product through the packaging. This is even more powerful than RFID, which allows you to check the mass serialization information through the outer packaging.

Jim backed this up. He noted “I too am enamored with the concept of 'authenticating' actual product through packaging, and this does take the serialization step farther, but with all the same issues with serialization; namely, how to interpret results.” Jim noted that wholesalers would have difficulty arguing for “having conclusive proof of authentic inventory”. Jim also offered the important observation that “the more complex and costly it is to 'authenticate' a product-- the happier a counterfeiter becomes, because they know very few people will have the means to check and so very few products will actually get checked". Indeed, trying to outspend a counterfeiter is never a good idea.

Based on this example of a very good technology being deployed into a rather challenging ecosystem, we see that the Ecosystem Score is really dependent on much more than technology. It depends on simplicity; that is, ease of training and implementation as much as ease of performing the authentication. It depends on an “impedance match” between what you are trying to prove and what you actually can easily prove. In my opinion, this technology will be very useful in screening large lots by (indepthly) analyzing only a sample of the product. It may be less useful at the item level.

-Steve

Sustainability and Security Printing & Imaging

StevenSimske — Thu, 17 Jul 2008 16:16:00 GMT

Why is a blog on Security Printing & Imaging important? A short list includes the ease, flexibility and ubiquity of product authentication that security printing and imaging enables; the novel and interdisciplinarian research underpinned; empowerment of the consumer through increased access to many layers of product information; and sustainability. I'll review the first three, but for today's blog I will focus on the (most likely) surprise entry on that list: sustainability.

1. Ease, flexibility and ubiquity of product authentication

Branded products use printing to convey the brand, SKU, product information and other data of salience to the consumer. Often, the printing is performed on the package or label. In other cases, the printing is performed on marketing collateral associated with the product. In the case of single event items, the printing literally is the product--i.e. lottery, sports tickets, concert/event tickets, entrance passes, etc.--no printing, no value. Regardless, the printing is highly tied to the product, and so authenticating the printing, if done within the right ecosystem surrounding the creation and lifecycling of the printing, is tantamount to authenticating the product. This has been discussed in past blogs under security variable data printing (e.g. see "Universal Acid", 19 May 2008), or SVDP.

2. The novel and interdisciplinarian research underpinned

You've likely heard both sides of the argument for the Space Race, which culminated in NASA landing half a dozen times on the moon and declaring victory over the USSR (although the USSR won every other event in the Space Race, so perhaps it is told and internalized differently in Russia). Proponents credit the Space Race for the computer, for color television, Nixon's visit to China, Detente, and more. The political advantages seem more likely, since for technology the consensus viewpoint appears to be that "the United States long ago learned that the spin-off argument is a weak one; although developing spacecraft does produce some useful technologies, it is generally inefficient. If you want a faster computer chip, then develop one; there is no need to go to the Moon to do so" (http://www.thespacereview.com/article/137/1). Others would say, more pointedly, "$30 Billion and all we got from that was Tang"? (Don't get me wrong, I like Tang, but I doubt it took $30 Billion to develop).

However, in the case of security printing and imaging, it is much more credible to argue that attacking counterfeiting will benefit many other important areas of research, including but not limited to: (1) novel cryptographic systems, (2) inspection, (3) quality monitoring and assurance, (4) imaging in general [from surveillance to improved authentication techniques to multimedia/multimodal imaging technologies], and (5) technology hybridization (e.g. merging printing with RFID). In addition, many novel security-printing-as-printing approaches are certain to benefit next-generation printing in arenas from sensors to printed electronics to printed batteries. More on these and other printing research areas will be described in future blogs, but suffice it to say that security printing and imaging cuts across many important technological disciplines and, in so doing, opens the door to novel advanced research.

3. Empowerment of the consumer through increased access to many layers of product information

Do you want your customer to spend more time with your product? If not, you should. Because advertising is still the most effective means to draw customers to your product. Ask Google. Their market cap to revenue ratio is roughly twice that of Microsoft, and eight times that of HP. They empower customers through simultaneously providing information and advertisement.

A simple packaging example is the in-store battery tester. Built onto the battery, this is a risky sensor--what if the battery isn't juiced anymore? But it gets the customer to spend a few extra seconds with the product--in essence, it's advertising. Every second counts--customers are much more likely to purchase a product they have interrogated.

Mobile bar code providers are seeing the on-product barcode reader as another means to garner customer/product interaction. Stick around, there will be plenty more on this in future blogs, too.

4. Sustainability

For most people, "sustainability" rightly evokes environmental concerns, usually featuring food production, oil production and global warming issues. Food production (and its high use of fossil fuels) is rightly the first focus, e.g. as noted on http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2008/07/17/10414/, "This year’s dead zone in the Gulf of Mexico is likely to be the largest on record and growing U.S. corn production is a primary cause of the worsening conditions, federal and state scientists said Tuesday"

But sustainability is also about not adding new environmental, fuel and/or complexity costs to a product. Let's face it, as described in (1.) above, you're going to print anyway. And, the printing stays with the package. You've added "nothing" to the environmental cost when you achieve security through printing that would have occurred anyway. As such, printing sustainability is assured through the extant approaches to recycling, repurposing, next-generation biofriendly inks, or from separating the label from the package.

Reuse is the best approach, but biodegradable recycling is a not-too-distant second. Take for example the introduction of biocompostable utensils--e.g. http://www.ecowise.com/index.php?cPath=22_187_195. This has changed the game for "to go" cups. So, will their be a biocompostable RFID? It is likely that RFID will always have a place in the supply chain, especially where line of sight is impractical or where track and trace is sufficient (authentication can occur elsewhere). If RFID can be printed with a biodegradable variable data print process, it will completely change the game for supply chain visibility and the marrying of track and trace with authentication.

Finally, sustainability can be achieved through the rationalizing of product recalls. That is to say, sustainability is also about not wasting. Ask yourself: Do product recalls help the planet? Only to the extent that they pull dangerous material off the shelf. But pulling everything off the shelf because some items are suspect is a huge waste. Recalls of counterfeited products right now are hampered by the lack of an effective means to determine what should be pulled from the shelves and destroyed, and what should be left there. Security variable data printing (SVDP) can provide "extra" variable regions that are used only when recall is required. These are not tracked, authenticated or advertised under normal circumstances, but are read and acted upon when there is a product recall. The surfeit of security marks that SVDP provides affords such an approach in a way no other security deterrent currently can. Remember that the same security features can be used for track and trace, authentication and forensics simultaneously. The nature and breadth of the SVDP features depends on how costly the product is, how skilled the inspectors/retailers used to manage the recall are, and how costly it is to with full confidence evaluate a potentially counterfeited product. Among other factors. But, the point is, it can be done (and is done).

Would you throw out an entire carpet because you dropped a staple? No, you'd try to vacuum it up. So, why throw out good product in order to make sure you've pulled all the counterfeits off the shelf? SVDP is the "recall vacuum". I highly recommend it as one of your brand protection expedients. It's a defensible--and sustainable--plan forward.

-Steve