Case Study: Right vs Right Now in a Big Company - Following the White Rabbit Blog -
Case Study: Right vs Right Now in a Big Company

As stated in a previous entry, I'm going to break down some of the [nameless] case-studies I've got in my notebook over the last several months.

As a note, if you read one of these and think it's you... feel free to tell me if I've missed a point or two.

A few weeks ago I had the pleasure of talking to a very intelligent security lead for a major us-based company that deals with *a lot* with your personal, credit and medical information.  What I found out as we started talking about application security and their approach to it - was that this particular person was very interested in actually securing their web applications whereas the business was just happy to check the PCI and HIPAA boxes and move on.  The classic problem ensued - how does this security leader successfully implement a security program when his or her business has absolutely no interest in doing "the right thing" but instead is interested in doing the "right now" thing?  I know this isn't really a revalation to anyone because this is a common problem.  What makes this case unique to me is the context of this problem, namely - where it's occurring.  I wish I could simply tell you the company but that would be almost completely irrelevant.... the only thing that's important here is that this problem exists.

So now we're faced with a problem.  IT Security wants to drive better code, no doubt there.  Development only cares about release cycles being faster and "more streamlined" so naturally this means that tools aren't an easy sell, and there is a large QA organization that load-tests and moves on.  Yikes.  Interestingly enough, there is a thing to be learned here, my security lead contact is approaching this brilliantly and I wanted to document this for the benefit for you, the other readers.

We've all heard someone say (and if you've been to a seminar of mine, you've heard me say it) that a security program isn't just implementing tools and checking a box.  While I whole-heartedly agree with that, there are approaches where someone who is strapped for cash, manpower, and security intelligence can kick-start their security program by implementing some basic SDLC [Software Development LifeCycle] -integrated security tools.  This is one of those approaches, I'd love to hear your comments either privately or via this blog.

  • Organizational Situation

The organizational structure is quite unique... the Security lead currently does not report to the head of IT, instead he or she reports under the legal/compliance branch of the company.  Interesting situation wouldn't you say?  That pretty much absolves the security team of operational duties and challenges... you would think.  Not so much but there's definitely leverage to be gained there, I assure you.  The security team is leading the charge on application security as a result of a PCI initiative (shocking) which is driving "check-the-box" exercise to implement some tool or process and move on.  These are challenges a large number of the readers of this blog can sympathize with.

  • Tactical Component

In order to get things going, this organization has chosen to work with a "kick-start" type approach which builds a security program starting with what would appear to be the blunt end of the security stick.  By implementing an enterprise "scanning" tool (in our case, AMP + WebInspect) to identify the *immediate needs* which exist in the production environment among the mission-critical web applications, they are goingn to use those metrics to demonstrate the need for a larger-scale approach to security web applications (there is much more to this, but this is the simple version).  Using a combination of tools and professional application assessment services to demonstrate the immediate need the security leader can then use "right now" money which comes from the PCI Compliance budget to accomplish a basic check-mark for PCI and demonstrate a need for a long-term, SDLC-integrated security program.  Collecting data and turning it into security intelligence (read: information) will make this component of the approach successful.  The side-effect of this approach is that it uses money slated for a short-term fix to accomplish that plus plant a seed which will hopefully sprout into a full-scale enterprise security program in the future.

  • Strategic Component

As part of the initial purchase of licenses (tools, just tools) the security leader is also purchasing other pieces which further integrate into the enterprise SDLC, and plan the seeds of security among the different departments (development and QA) which traditionally have no interest in security.  While it's in their best-interest to produce secure code (development) and identify security defects (QA), departments outside security don't traditionally think "security"... so these tools can demonstrate how simple it can be to produce secure code with minimal effort.

  • Executive Summary - Prognosis

Voila!  Long-term strategy... which then starts to sprout policy, process, and education to create a real enterprise-grade web application security program.  The program is *not based* on tools, but is built off of a foundation that bootstraps from some tools to get the initial gears moving.  Like I've said all along, the program won't be built around tools - but the tools can be used to help kick-start a program that otherwise would have little chance of getting off the ground.  I feel very confident that this particular security leader's approach will be successful, and may even get him or her promoted :)

* This is a specific case-study.  If you'd like to hear more about how this potentially applies to your company, or how you can get help kick-starting a security program within your security-agnostic organization... pop me an email directly and I'll be happy to open a discussion.


Posted 09-09-2008 2:01 AM by RafalLos

Comments

Andre Gironda wrote re: Case Study: Right vs Right Now in a Big Company
on 09-09-2008 8:55 AM

Don't lead with a tool.  When you lead with a tool, you're not really leading, you're just paying for awareness to an issue that you shouldn't have to pay for.  The statistics are good enough.  97% of web applications have critical vulnerabilities.  You don't need WebInspect to tell you how bad you are compared to the rest of the world.  There's no way that you can trust your CIO, engineering manager, or anyone in the dev department.  Those in the magical 3% run static content web applications.

My spidey-sense is going off on the vendor-bias right now.  Please don't feed the animals.

You start off great -- SDLC, not "technology" or "products".  Then you start to recommend products.  Worse, the products are pen-testing-only tools.  Worse, they are blackbox tools.

Think about tools that can actually be integrated with the SDLC.  First of all, realize that they don't exist.  Secondly, realize that they shouldn't exist, because they should be customized.  Lastly, realize that pen-testing isn't the goal, it's just another tool in the toolbox itself.

I am starting to realize that the problem with education is not with the developers, but instead with everyone else.  If we would all just sit and think about what we're doing wrong -- it will be obvious that the problem is right in front of us.  We've been selling the wrong things, and the industry analysts and their briefings have been eating it up for years.

This isn't about PCI -- heck it's not even about SOX, GLB (and especially not about HIPAA).  Yes, compliance is the largest driver to application security.  However, there is something clearly driving compliance. Figure out what that is and we might actually solve some real issues.

As a final point, I'd like to suggest that in the very-near future, we'll start to see many more organizations planning around Compliance with alternate, unlisted controls.  They will do so because it's cheaper than checking a box.  As an aside, how many organizations do you know of that utilize a wiser security boutique for assessments before their giant QSAC circus-act audit review?

Let's look at a better strategical/tactical plan:

1. (Strategy) Monitor application security.  Enumerate applications -- their versions, locations, priority, risk equations, et al.  Keep this list up-to-date by automated means so that there is always a "live-view"

2. (Strategy) Application security central point of contact placed by the board of directors or someone at or above CEO/President

3. (Strategy and Tactics) Application security incident response plan

4. (Strategy) Your QA points above, but realize the difference between developer testing and traditional software quality engineering.  Agile/XP/TDD/Design-by-contract projects require integration of security for both developer testing and SQA

5. (Strategy) Software risk expertise, customized to your custom applications.  Usually this requires an external third-party unless you have people that have been doing this for years internally

6. (Tactics) Add secure SDLC expertise in the form of moderators with the right tools: hybrid/composite tools for combined advanced pen-testing and general secure code review activities.  Get the experts, make sure that they can get results using only free/open-source tools (e.g. unit testing frameworks, code coverage analyzers, FindBugs/FxCop/PaiMei/EFS, PMD/StyleCop/RATS/ITS4, XSSDetect, Jupiter, syntax highlighting, IDE built-ins, wiki's, etc), then add cheap tools (Security Innovation, IDA Pro, GrammaTech CodeSurfer), mid-range tools (Ounce, Checkmarx, GrammaTech CodeSonar), and lastly high-end tools (Fortify, Klocwork, DevInspect, AppScan DE, Compuware).  I would place Veracode and WhiteHatSec in the mid-range section of tools, but note that there is a significant trade-off: while SaaS reduces the false-positive rate from 80% to 20%, it also increases the false-negative rate from 20% to 80%.  There are no free-lunches

RafalLos wrote re: Case Study: Right vs Right Now in a Big Company
on 09-10-2008 3:26 AM

@Andre: First off, I'm flattered that you'd take the time to write such a long response.

You seem to disagree with a lot of what the "real world" throws at us, and our response to it.  I don't contend that this case-study is a perfect solution, or that it's in any parallel universe ideal - but this is real.  This is reality.

I do so wish that I could simply walk into a client and say "you need to build x, y, and z" but the reality is that they'd throw me out because they often don't care long-term, or big picture or any other cliche I can pitch here.  My reality is that I'm trying to use the client's available means, budget, and foresight to do right by them the best we're able to.  That's what I bring to my clients.

Anyway - again, thanks for the response; if you're at OWASP in a few weeks we can go a few rounds at a local watering hole.

Andre Gironda wrote re: Case Study: Right vs Right Now in a Big Company
on 09-10-2008 11:15 PM

@Rafal:

I'm not trying to compare my reality vs. your reality.

However, just so that you know, my advice is directly taken from over 120 enterprises in a diverse set of industries.

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on 12-27-2008 6:18 PM

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